Probability of Success, Last Resort, and Proportionality

In this blog post I will look into further analysis on the final three necessary aspects of Just War Theory-Probability of Success, Last Resort, and Proportionality-before comparing these rules with the actions of Vladimir Putin in the Ukraine this past February. By looking into these and determining whether or not they apply to the annexation of Crimea, I will combine them with the other previously analyzed aspects of the theory and decide whether or not Putin's actions follow the Just War theory as a whole or not.

Pro-Ukrainian Protesters

Firstly, Probability of Success entails that there must be a high chance of winning the war before going into it to ensure that the conflict is not futile and therefore a waste of time, resources, and an unnecessary loss of life for both sides. I would say that in the case of Putin, there was a pretty high chance of success for his annexation because Russia's military is much stronger than Ukraine's and there had also been fairly high support for the process by many Ukrainian citizens, thus making it an even smoother annexation with less resistance. Putin knew that the region was a fairly easy target and therefore adhered well to the idea of probability of success.

Second, Last Resort means that war may only be explored as an option after all other peaceful choices have been exhausted and had been proven ineffective. Sometimes, peace talks and negotiations are not actually efficient means of avoiding conflict because they are just used as a way to buy time. In Putin's case, I feel that he very clearly did not use invasion as a last resort, rather he performed this action illegally and with little to no prior discussion with Ukrainian leaders on the subject. Considering these factors, it is clear to say that Putin did not obey the law of last resort.

Lastly, Proportionality brings about the idea that the benefits of declaring and waging a war must be greater than the potential downsides. It is hard to decide on this point because this can be extremely subjective. However, it is my belief that the economic benefit of a warm-water port does not outweigh the evil atrocities committed by the Russian military during the invasion in which pro-Ukrainian protesters had been "attacked, abducted, and tortured", not to mention the complete disregard for the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state.

Map of Ukraine showing its divisions and how many people list Russian as their native language

Competent Authority and Right Intention in Crimea

In this blog post, I will analyze the next two criteria for the Just War theory in terms of Vladimir Putin's actions in Crimea- Competent Authority and Right Intention. The idea of competent authority refers to who has the right to declare and wage a war. The criterion for this is that "a just war must be initiated by a political authority within a political system that allows distinction of justice. Dictatorships or deceptive military actions are typically considered as violations of this criterion. Plainly, we cannot have a genuine process of judging a just war within a system that represses the process of genuine justice." Right intention, however, refers to the idea that force may be used only in a truly just cause and solely for that purpose- correcting a suffered wrong is considered a right intention, while material gain or maintaining economies is not.

In terms of competent authority, I believe that Putin certainly counts as a political authority who presides over a political system with a distinction of justice. While the Russian Federation may have differing ideas from ours about what constitutes justice and right, it goes without saying that they do indeed have a legitimate court and law system. 

For right intention, however, there is a different interpretation. While Putin and his followers may have truly believed that their cause to regain Russian territories and "protect ethnic Russians" in these places, at the most basic level this annexation was brought on by a desire for material gain and economic purposes. The desire for a warm-water port (a great advantage in trade and economics) was a large factor in sending troops into the Ukraine. Since material gain and economic maintenance are used here as reasoning for the invasion, Putin's actions do not constitute right intention. 

Warm-Water Port Krym in Crimea

Just War Theory and the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Now that I have spent four blog posts summarizing the main points in Mr. Putin, it is time to look into the ethical considerations of this book in a biblical context. In my Biblical Heritage class, we have talked many times about the idea of a just war and possible justifications for violence, especially through Saint Thomas Aquinas' Just War Theory. Aquinas' Just War theory includes guidelines for both Jus ad Bellum (right to go to war) and Jus in Bello (right conduct in war). Jus ad bellum contains seven different required elements-Just Cause, Comparative Justice, Competent Authority, Right Intention, Probability of Success, Last Resort, and Proportionality. In the next few blog posts, I will examine these factors and analyze whether or not Vladimir Putin's actions against the Ukraine hold up to the test.

Firstly, I will look into the Just Cause element. According to the Just War theory, Just Cause comes about only when there are lives at stake or in danger and must never be used to regain something or to punish a nation or group of people. It is important that an act of war is never for the purpose of a specific goal in a nation's self-interest, but rather that it only be put into action in order to establish or re-establish peace.

In the case of Putin's actions in Crimea, it is my personal belief that they do not adhere to the element of Just Cause because Putin's main reasons for invading the Ukraine include the desire for a warm water port (which is located there), the acquisition of natural resources, and the acquisition of agricultural resources. All of these reasons serve to benefit Russia in some way while offering no promise of peace or prosperity to the Ukrainian people.

Secondly, the element of Comparative Justice also proves to not be a factor in Putin's motives. Comparative Justice states that the injustices incurred by the attacker must be significantly higher and worse than those incurred by the nation being attacked. This clearly does not apply to Putin's actions because the Ukraine had not inflicted any injustice on Russia prior to the attacks. In the next few posts I will continue to analyze the other aspects of the Just War theory to see if any apply to the Russia-Ukraine conflict.